Now the Vijnana or consciousness that discends into the embryo in
Mothers womb is only the effect of the impressions or samkara of the past existence. From the last state of past to be samkara in a concentrated manner creates effects in present life. Now these impressions or samsara, which enables re birth are due to avidya or ignorance about truth. The truth, that life is full of suffering, if realized no karma will arise which causes re-birth-ultimately.
Ignorance or avidya is the root cause of rebirth-death-rebirth cycle.
Thus (1) Suffering is due to (2) Birth which is due to (3) the will which is due to (4) mental clinging which is due to (5) thirst which is due to (6) sense experience which is due to (7) Sense-object contact which is due to (8) the six sense organs which is due to (9) the embryonic organum which is due to (10) some initial consciousness which is due to (11) the impression of the experience of past to be which is finally due to ignorance of truth. 3 Hence we have the twelve links in the chair of causation. Those twelve links are not always same in all the sermons but the majority treats these as the fall and standard account. Many expressions such as dvadasanidan (the twelve sources) as well as the bhavachakra (the wheel of rebirth) signify this. The abhidhammata sangha dvides them into past, present and future life also
The Cessassion of suffering (Dukha Nirodha)
The third noble truth follows from the second noble truth that suffering is conditional. If these conditions ae removed, the suffering would end. We should remember that nirvana is not a state of inactivity. It is true that one has to practice detachment to attain nirvana, but once nirvana is attained, the liberated person should neither always remain in meditation nor wholly withdraw from active life like traveling preaching, founding brotherhood etc.
The fourth noble truth about the path to liberation. (Astanga

Marga)
The path to liberation or nirvana consists of eight steps which is called the eight-fold noble path or astanga marga. This could be treated as the essence of Buddha's ethics. This is meant not only for the monks but also for lay men. Now one has to earn his lively hood through honest means.
Even to maintain one's life one should not resort to forbidden means. This rule further stresses the necessity of constant vigilance.
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One must constantly bear in mind the things be had already learned.
He must remember and constantly contemplate on them. Then only he can continue on the right path. One who successfully crossed the above seven staes is now ready to step into the four deeper stages of meditation which can take him to cessation of suffering. His mind had already become unruffled on reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (vichara).
Regarding the truths, he enjoys joy through the case born of In this chapter it is impossible for me to even try to look at all these. Therefore let me try to understand some of the principles which are explicitly stated by Buddha himself. Let me further compress these into four views such as (1) the theory of dependent orgination (2) the theory of Karma (3) the theory of change and (4) the theory of the non existence of the soul. 7
(1) The theory of dependent orgination or the conditional existence of things.
Whatever is, is conditioned by something else. All events, whether mental or physical, depends on something else. This law of universal causation (Dharma) is an automatic process without the help of any supreme consciousness. Whenever a cause appears, it is followed by a particular effect. Thus everything has a cause.
Nothing happens without a cause. one of which may be briefly noticed here: The criterion of the existence (satta) of a thing is its capacity to produce some effect (arthakriya-karitva-laksanam sat). A non-existent thing, like a hare's horn, cannot produce any effect. Now, from this criterion of existence, it may be deduced that a thing having existence must be momentary. If, for example, a thing like a seed be not accepted to be momentary, but thought, to be lasting for more than one moment, then we have to show that it is capable of producing an effect during each moment it exists. Again, if it really remains the same unchanging thing during these moments, then it should be able to produce the same effect at every one of those moments. But we find that this is not the case. The seed in the house does not produce the seedling which is generated by a seed sown in the field. The seed in the house cannot then be the same as that in the field. But it may be said that though the seed does not actually produce the same effect always, it always has the potentiality to produce, and this potentiality becomes kinetic in the presence of suitable auxiliary conditions like earth, water, etc. 11 Therefore, the seed is always the same. But this defence is weak; because then it is virtually confessed that the seed of the first moment is not the cause of the seedling, but that the seed modified by the other conditions really causes the effect. Hence the seed must be admitted to have changed. In this way it may be shown regarding everything that it does not stay unchanged during any two moments, because it does not produce the identical effect during both moments. Hence everything lasts only for a moment.
The Theory of the Non-existence of the Soul
The law of change is universal; neither man, nor any other being, animate or inanimate, is exempt from it. It is commonly believed that in man there is an abiding substance called the soul 
THE SCHOOLS OF BUDDHA PHILOSOPHY
It has been found again and again in the history of human thought that every reasoned attempt to avoid philosophy lands a thinker into a new kind of philosophy.
In spite of Buddha's aversion to theoretical speculation, he never wanted to accept, nor did he encourage his followers to accept, any course of action without reasoning and criticism. He was extremely rational and contemplative, and wanted to penetrate into the very roots of human existence, and tried to supply the full justification of the ethical principles he followed and taught. It was no-wonder, therefore, that he himself incidentally laid down the foundation of a philosophical system. His philosophy, partly expressed and partly implicit, may be called positivism in so far as he taught that our thoughts should be confined to this world and to the improvement of our existence here. It may be called phenomenalism in so far as he taught that we were sure-only of the phenomena we experienced. It is, therefore, a kind of empiricism in method because experience, according-to him, was the source of knowledge.
These different aspects of his philosophy came to be developed by his followers along different lines as they were required to justify Buddha's teaching, to defend it from the severe criticism it had to face in India and outside, and to convert other thinkers to their fold. Buddha's reluctance to discuss the ten metaphysical questions concerning things beyond our experience and his silence about them came to-be interpreted by his followers in different lines. Some took this attitude as only the sign of a thoroughgoing empiricism which must frankly admit the inability of mind to decide non-empirical questions. According to this explanation, Buddha's attitude would be regarded as scepticism. Some other followers, mostly the Mahayanists, interpreted Buddha's view neither as a denial of reality beyond objects of ordinary experience, nor as a denial of any means of knowing the non-empirical reality, but only as signifying the indescribability of that transcendental experience and reality. The justification of this last interpretation can be obtained from some facts of Buddha's life and teachings.
Ordinary empiricists believe that our sense-experience is the only basis of all our knowledge; they do not admit the possibility of any non-sensuous experience. Buddha, however, taught the possibility of man's attaining nirvana an experience or consciousness which was not generated by the activity of the sense. The supreme value and importance that he attached to this non-empirical consciousness, justify his followers in supposing that he regarded this as the supreme reality, as well. The fact that very often Buddha used to say that he had a profound experience of things 'far beyond, which is 'comprehended only by the wise' and 'not grasped by mere logic,' may be taken to mean that his non-empirical experience can neither be logically proved with arguments nor be expressed in empirical ideas and language. These grounds lead some followers, as we shall "How is external reality known to exist?" these third groups of thinkers, who believe in external reality, give two different answers. The doctrine of Sunya-vada has been understood in India, by non-Buddhist philosophers in general, to mean that the universe is totally devoid of reality, that everything is sunya or void. In setting forth this doctrine in his Sarvadarsana-sangraha, Madhavacarya has mentioned the followirfg as an argument in its support. The self (or the knower), the object (or the known) and knowledge are mutually interdependent. The reality of one depends on each of the other two, and if one be false, the others also must be so (just as the fatherhood of any person will be proved false if .the existence of his children be proved to be false). But it must be admitted by all that when we perceive a snake, in a rope, the object perceived, namely, the snake is absolutely false. Hence the mind or the subject which knows such an object turns out to be false and its knowledge also becomes false.
Thus it may be concluded that all that we perceive within or without, along with their perception and .the percipient mind, are illusory like dream-objects. There is, therefore, nothing, mental or non-mental, which is real. The universe is sunya or void of reality.
From such arguments it would appear that, according to the what it is not. In the Lankavatara-sutra (sagathaka, 167) it is stated that the real nature of objects cannot be ascertained by the intellect and cannot, therefore, be described. That which is real must be independent and should not depend on anything else for its existence and origination. But everything we know of is dependent on some condition. Hence it cannot be real. Again, it cannot be said to be unreal because an unreal thing, like a castle in the air, can never come into existence. "To say that it is both real and unreal or that it is neither real nor unreal, would be unintelligible jargon.
Sunyata or voidness is the name for this indeterminable, indescribable real nature of things. Things appear to exist, but when we try to understand the real nature of their existence our intellect is baffled. It cannot be called either real or unreal, or both real and unreal, or neither real nor unreal.
It will be seen that in the above arguments, the indescribable nature of things is deduced from the fact of their being dependent on other things or conditions. Nagarjuna says, therefore, "The fact of dependent origination is called by us sunyata." "There is no dharma The conditionality of things which makes their own nature (svabhava) unascertainable, is either real or unreal, etc., may be also regarded as a kind of relativity. Every character of a thing is conditioned by something else and therefore, its existence is relative to that condition. Sunya-vada can, therefore, also be interpreted as a theory of relativity which declares that nothing, no phenomenal experienced, has a fixed, absolute, independent character of its own (svabhava) and, therefore, no description of any phenomenon can be said to be unconditionally true.
To this philosophy of phenomena (or things as they appear to us), the Madhyamikas add a philosophy of noumenon (or reality in itself). Buddha's teachings regarding dependent origination, impermanence, etc., apply, they hold, only to the phenomenal world, to things commonly observed by us in ordinary experience. The truth of the lower order is only a stepping-stone to the attainment of the higher. The nature of nirvana-experience which takes one beyond ordinary experience cannot be described; it can only be suggested negatively with the help of words which describe our common experience. Nagarjuna, therefore, describes nirvana with a series of negatives, thus: "That which is not known (ordinarily), not acquired anew, not destroyed, not eternal, not suppressed, not generated is called nirvana." As with nirvana and also with the Tathagata one who has realized nirvana. His nature also cannot be described. That is why, when Buddha was asked what becomes of the Tathagata after nirvana is attained, he declined to discuss the question.
In the same light the silence of Buddha regarding all metaphysical questions about non-empirical things can be interpreted to mean that he believed in a transcendental experience and reality, the truths about which cannot be described in terms of common experience. Buddha's frequent statements that he had realized some profound truth which reasoning cannot grasp can be cited also to support this Madhyamika contention about the transcendental. 16 It may be noted here that in its conception of two fold truth, its denial of the phenomenal world, its negative description of the transcendental, and its conception of nirvana as the attainment of unity with the transcendental self, the Madhyamika approaches very close to Advaita Vedanta as taught in some Upanisads and elaborated later by Gaudapada and Sankaracarya.
The Yogachra School of Subjective Idealism
While agreeing with the Madhyamikas, as to the unreality of external objects, the Yogacara School differs from them in holding that the mind (citta) cannot be regarded as unreal. For then all reasoning and thinking would be false and the Madhyamikas could not even establish that their own arguments were correct. To say that everything, mental or non-mental, is unreal is suicidal. The reality of the mind should at least be admitted in order to make correct thinking possible.
The mind, consisting of a stream of different kinds of ideas, is the only reality. Things that appear to be outside the mind, our body as well as other objects, are merely ideas of the mind. Just as in cases of dreams and hallucinations a man fancies to perceive things outside, though they do not really exist there, similarly the objects which appear to be out there, are really ideas in the the existence of any external object cannot be proved, because it cannot be shown that the object is different from the consciousness of the object. As Dharma-kirti states, the blue colour and the consciousness of the blue colour are identical, because they are never perceived to exist separately. Though really one, they appear as two owing to illusion, just as the moon appears as two owing to defective vision. As an object is never known without the consciousness of it, the object cannot be proved to have an existence independent of consciousness.
The Yogacharas also point out the following absurdities which arise from the admission of an object external to the mind. An external object, if admitted, must be either partless (i.e., atomic) or composite (i.e., composed of many parts). But atoms are too small to be perceived. A composite thing (like a pot) also cannot be perceived, because it is not possible to perceive simultaneously all the sides and parts of the object. Nor can it be said to be perceived part by part, because, if those parts are atomic they are too small to be perceived, and if they are composite, the original objection again arises. So if one admits extra-mental objects, the perception of these objects cannot be explained. These objections do not arise if the object be nothing other than consciousness, because the question of parts and whole does not arise with regard to consciousness.
Another difficulty is that the consciousness of the object cannot arise before the object has come into existence. Neither can it arise afterwards, because the object, being momentary, vanishes as soon as it arises. The external object, according to those who admit it, being the cause of consciousness cannot be simultaneous with consciousness. Nor can it be said that the object may be known by consciousness after it has ceased to exist. For in that case the object being in the past there cannot be any immediate knowledge of perception of it. Perception of present objects, as we must admit always to have, remains, therefore, unexplained if objects are supposed to be external to the mind-This difficulty does not arise, if the object be supposed to be nothing other than-consciousness. 17 The Yogachara view is called Vijnana-vada or idealism because it admits that there is only one kind of reality which is of the nature of consciousness (vijana) and objects which appear to be material or external to consciousness are really ideas or states of consciousness. This theory may be described further as subjective idealism, because according to it the existence of an object perceived is not different from the subject or the perceiving mind.
One of the chief difficulties of subjective idealism is: If an object depends for its existence solely on the subject, then, how is it that the mind cannot create at will any object at any time? How is it explained that objects do not change, appear or disappear at the will of the perceiver? To explain this difficulty, the Vijana-vadin says that the mind is a stream of momentary conscious states and within the stream there lie buried the impressions of all past experience. At a particular moment impression comes to the surface of consciousness the circumstances of the moment are the most at that moment that impression attains maturity (paripaka), so to say, and develops into immediate consciousness or perception. It is thus that at that particular moment only that object, whose latent impression can, under the circumstances, reveal itself becomes perceived; just as in the case of the revival of past impressions in memory,, though all the impressions are in the mind, only some are remembered at a particular time. This is why only some object can be perceived at a time and not any at will. 18 The mind considered in its aspect of being a store-house or home of all impressions is called by the Vijnana-vadins Alaya-vijnana.
It may be regarded as the potential mind and answers to the soul or atman of other systems, with the difference that it is not one unchanging substance like the soul, but is a stream of continuously changing states. Through, culture and self-control this Alaya-vijnana or the potential mind can gradually stop the arising of undesirable mental states and develop into the ideal state of nirvana. Otherwise, it only gives rise to thoughts, desires, attachment which bind one more and more to the fictitious external world. The mind, the-only reality 'according to this school, is truly its own place, it can make heaven of hell and hell of heaven. 19 The Yogacharas are so called either because they used to practise yoga by which they came to realize the sole reality of mind (as Alaya-vijnana) dispelling all belief in the external world, or because they combined in them both critical inquisitiveness (yoga) and good conduct (acara). Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga are the famous leaders of the Yogacara school. Lankavatara-sutra is one of its most important works.
The Sautrantika School of Representationism-
The Sautrantikas believe in the reality not only of the mind, but also of external objects. They point out that without the supposition of some external objects; it is not possible to explain even the illusory appearance of external objects. If one never perceived anywhere any external object, he could not say, as a Vijnana-vadin does, that, through illusion, consciousness appears like an external object. The phrase 'like an external object' is as meaningless as 'like the son of a barren mother,' because an external object is said by the Vijnanavadin to be wholly unreal and never perceived. Again, the argument from the simultaneity of consciousness and object to their identity is also defective. Whenever we have the perception of an object like a pot, the pot is felt as external and consciousness of it as internal (i.e.
to be in the mind). So the object, from the very beginning, is known to be different from and not identical with consciousness. If the pot perceived were identical with the subject, the perceiver would have said, "I am the pot." Besides, if there were no external objects, the distinction between the 'consciousness of a pot' and the consciousness of a cloth could not be explained, because as consciousness both are identical; it is only regarding the objects that they differ.
Hence, we must admit the existence of different external objects outside consciousness. These objects give particular forms to the different states of consciousness. From these forms or representations of the objects in the mind we can infer the existence of their causes, i.e., objects outside the mind.
The reason why we cannot perceive at will any object at any time and place, lies in the fact that perception depends on four different conditions and not simply on the mind. There must be the object to impart its form to consciousness, there must be the conscious mind (or the state of the mind at the just previous moment) to cause the consciousness of the form, there must be the sense to determine the kind of the consciousness, that is, whether the consciousness of that object would be visual, actual or of any other kind. Lastly, there must be some favourable auxiliary condition, such as light, convenient position, perceptible magnitude, etc. All these combined together bring about the perception of the object.
The form of the object thus generated in the mind, is the effect of the object, among other things. The existence of the objects is not of 
The Vaibhasika School
While agreeing with the Sautrantikas regarding the reality of both the mental and the non-mental, the Vaibhasikas, like many modern neo-realists, point out that unless we admit that external objects are perceived by us, their existence cannot be known in any other way. Inference of fire from the perception of smoke is possible because in the past we have perceived both smoke and fire together.
One who does not have the knowledge of the invariable concomitance or vyapti cannot infer its existence from the perception of smoke. If external objects were never perceived, as the Sautrantikas hold, then they could not even be inferred simply from their mental forms. 20 To one unacquainted with an external object, the mental form would not appear to be the copy or the sign of the existence of an extra-mental object, but as an original thing which does not owe its existence to anything outside the mind. Either, therefore, we have to accept subjective idealism (vijnana-vada) or, if that has been found unsatisfactory, we must admit that the external object is directly known. The Vaibhasikas thus come to hold a theory of direct realism (bahya-pratyaksa-vada).
The Abhidhamma treatises formed the general foundation of the philosophy of the realists. The Yaibhasikas followed exclusively a particular commentary, Vibhasa (or Abhidhamma-mahavibhasa) on an
Ahbidhamma treatise (Ahhidharma-jnana-prasthana) hence their name.
THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM
Hinayana and Mahayana
In respect of religion Buddhism is divided, as we know, into the two great schools, the Hinayana and the Mahayana. 
